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 3
Abstract 
 
For the very first time in EU history, the 2014 EP elections provided citizens with the 
opportunity to influence the nomination of the Commission President by casting a vote for the 
main Europarties’ ‘lead candidates’. By subjecting the position of the Commission President 
to an open political contest, many experts have formulated the expectation that heightened 
political competition would strengthen the weak electoral connection between EU citizens 
and EU legislators, which some consider a root cause for the EU’s lack of public support. In 
particular, this contest was on display in the so-called ‘Eurovision Debate’, a televised debate 
between the main contenders for the Commission President broadcasted live across Europe. 
Drawing on a quasi-experimental study conducted in 24 EU countries, we find that debate 
exposure led to increased cognitive and political involvement and EU support among young 
citizens. Unfortunately, the debate has only reached a very small audience. 
 
Keywords 
 
EP election campaign; EU attitudes; political knowledge; televised debate 
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 4
Introduction 
 
Concerns about the European Union’s (EU) democratic qualities are as old as the European 
integration project itself, as are suggestions and attempts to remedy the EU’s democratic 
deficit. The creation and gradual expansion of the European Parliament’s (EP) prerogatives 
and, in particular, the introduction of direct elections to the EP in 1979, are among the major 
institutional innovations to address this deficit (see, e.g., Tulli 2016; Rittberger 2012). 
However, expectations that the empowerment of the EP over time and the introduction of 
direct elections would strengthen the electoral connection between citizens and elected EU 
legislators have been largely disappointed (see Hix and Hoyland 2013). In sharp contrast to 
national elections and parliaments, EP elections are much less attractive to voters, as the 
considerably lower (and declining) turnout rates indicate. Consequently, EP elections have 
been referred to as “second-order national elections” (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Parties, media 
and ultimately also voters treat them as national contests, with EU-related issues taking a 
backseat. 
 
Follesdal and Hix (2006) have advanced a powerful argument that the key to mend the weak 
electoral connection is to foster political competition at the EU-level. Absent a true electoral 
contest at the EU-level, whose outcome would affect the course of the EU’s policy agenda 
and absent a choice to determine the EU’s top political personnel, the electoral connection is 
likely to stay weak (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 552). While battles over the direction of the 
EU’s policy agenda have become a regular feature of political decision-making inside the EP 
as well as between the EP and the Council (Hix and Hoyland 2013), these developments have, 
thus far, not affected electoral competition in the run-up to EP elections. At the same time, 
aspirations are high that a contest over the EU’s (top) personnel decisions might be more 
effective in infusing competition in the electoral campaign preceding EP elections: One of the 
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 5
most important posts in the EU’s political system is the President of the European 
Commission, who defines the Commission’s work programme and thus sets its policy-making 
priorities. For many observers, the “role of the Commission is not fundamentally different 
from other political executives.” (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 554; Hix 2008: 155). Hence, 
subjecting the office of the Commission President to an open political contest rather than 
letting heads of state and government pick their preferred candidate in ‘smoked filled rooms’ 
has become a battle call for academics, pundits and politicians sharing concerns about the 
EU’s democratic deficit and lack of political competition. A contest for one of the EU’s top 
political offices should contribute to mend the electoral connection: Citizens are likely to be 
better informed about EU policy objectives when there are competitive elections and higher 
stakes, they should also be more motivated to participate in EP elections, and possibly confer 
a higher degree of legitimacy and the EU as a polity (see, e.g., Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 
2008). 
 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, political activists and elites were now 
presented with a new institutional mechanism, which was premised on the idea to connect 
voters with the exercise of political power at the EU-level.1 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the 
European Council nominated a candidate for Commission President, and once the heads of 
state and government had made up their minds, the chosen candidate was submitted to the EP 
for approval. Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union, which was amended through the 
Lisbon Treaty, now stipulates: 
 
“Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the 
appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall 
propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This 
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 6
candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component 
members.” (Publications Office of the European Union 2010: 26) 
 
In the run-up to the 2014 EP elections, political pressure emanated from the Commission and 
the EP, as well as from several national capitals to fundamentally alter the nomination process 
for the successor of José Manuel Barroso, then Commission President at the time. Both, 
Barroso, the main party groups in the EP, and the majority of transnational European party 
groups (Europarties) called for a process whereby each Europarty would nominate a ‘lead 
candidate’ for the Commission’s top office. These lead candidates would, in turn, play a 
central role in the political campaign for the 2014 EP elections. While the implementation of 
the lead candidate-concept was hotly contested (see, e.g., Hobolt 2014), it also marked a 
watershed, since each Europarty did in fact nominate a transnational candidate for the 
Commission’s top post. 
 
The 2014 EP election campaign thus provides for an ideal quasi-experimental setting to 
explore whether the expectation that increased political competition improves the electoral 
connection and hence the quality of democracy is borne out in reality. In this article, our focus 
is on one particular innovation of the 2014 EP election campaign, which is directly connected 
to the contest of different lead candidates for the position of Commission President: The 
campaign included a series of televised debates among these candidates, the most prominent 
of which took place on 15 May 2014. The so-called ‘Eurovision debate’, a multilingual 90-
minute discussion among the Europarty nominees for Commission President, addressed some 
of the most pressing problems facing the EU and was broadcasted on numerous TV stations, 
radio channels and internet streams throughout and even beyond the EU. The Eurovision 
debate was the culmination of a series of televised debates (totalling seven) during the 2014 
EP election campaign. What rendered the Eurovision debate special compared to the other 
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 7
debates was that it starred all five top candidates for the post, whereas in the other debates 
only two to four candidates were invited (sometimes not even including the top candidates). 
Moreover, the Eurovision debate was broadcasted in the vast majority of the EU member 
states, while the other debates were aired in only a subset of member states (for an overview 
see Maier and Faas 2014). 
 
Hence, for the very first time in the history of the EU an overwhelming majority of EU 
citizens had the unprecedented opportunity to compare the positions and personalities of the 
candidates running for Commission President in a campaign format familiar from the context 
of national elections. In this article we inquire whether the debate generated the desired effect, 
i.e., did it contribute to improving the EU’s democratic quality because EU citizens now have 
an actual opportunity to influence who will be the next Commission President?2 The literature 
on televised debates at the national level has demonstrated that these campaign formats affect 
voters, i.e., their cognitions, motivations, attitudes, and even voting choices. Whether this has 
been the case in the 2014 European election and whether the TV debate format incites 
electoral competition are open questions, which this article sets out to address. To do so, we 
present the results of a quasi-experimental study with young voters conducted in 24 EU 
member states. Since we have carried out a quasi-experiment with self-selected student 
samples, our data is neither representative for any of the countries under investigation nor for 
young voters. Hence, like other lab-experiments our data lacks external validity. Nevertheless, 
the data is very valuable as it has a high degree of internal validity. In addition, there is 
evidence that voluntary student samples are appropriate for experimental effect studies (see 
Druckman and Kam 2011). 
 
We proceed as follows: In the next section (2.), we will bring together some of the key 
arguments from the EU’s democratic deficit-debate, hinted at above, and the literature on 
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 8
televised debates to develop expectations about the possible effects of the Eurovision debate 
on voters: This will allow us to analyse, in the next step, whether political competition 
improves voter knowledge about candidates, whether it motivates them to cast a vote, and 
whether competition affects EU-related attitudes. In section 3, we describe the research design 
and data, followed by an empirical analysis of the impact of the Eurovision debate (4.). Our 
results show that the debate had a recognizable impact on our respondents, indicating higher 
cognitive and political involvement, as well as attitudinal changes. In the final section (5.) we 
will critically discuss these findings and suggest avenues for further research. 
 
Electoral competition and EU support: Insights from research on TV debates 
 
Following Robert Dahl (1971), a democratic polity ought to be responsive to the preferences 
of its citizens, and for government to be responsive it has to provide guarantees for effective 
public participation as well as for public policies and electoral offices to be open to public 
contestation. Moreover, for decisions to be meaningful and informed there has to be access to 
alternative sources of information. Follesdal and Hix (2006) echo the Dahlian perspective on 
democracy when they diagnose that a lack of public contestation is at the core of the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy deficit. Introducing contestation by means of a debate on EU issues 
combined with an electoral contest about the EU’s top executive post should, so they argue, 
lessen the legitimacy deficit and mend the electoral connection between citizens and EU 
legislators (Hix 2008: 86). What about the mechanisms linking electoral competition and a 
growing sense of democratic legitimacy? Political contestation strengthens the “subjective 
content of democracy by providing a battle for control of political power and the policy 
agenda at the European level, between rival groups of leaders with rival policy platforms, 
where the winner and losers of this battle are clearly identifiable” (Hix 2008: 85). More 
competition “would also enable citizens to understand European policy issues, to form 
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 9
opinions about the options available, and in time accept why certain reforms are necessary 
rather than reject any policy change directed from Brussels as illegitimate” (Hix 2008: 108). 
Heightened political contestation and debate are thus hypothesized to affect citizens’ attitudes 
towards the EU and, in turn, positively impact the EU’s perceived democratic quality. Could 
exposure to a televised debate among the top candidates for the Commission Presidency 
affect voters’ knowledge about the EU, increase their motivation and ability to form opinions 
about EU issues, as suggested by the proponents of instilling more political contestation into 
the EU arena? 
 
First, a televised debate in the run-up to the EP elections could have an impact on citizens’ 
political cognitions: “A debate would make the candidates more widely recognizable, and 
enable […] the public to understand the personal and policy differences between the 
candidates” (Hix 2008: 161). More precisely, Hix (2008: 162) suggests “the public would be 
able to identify who the Commission president is and what he or she aims to achieve”. 
Turning to the debate literature, the majority of debate researchers agree that viewers do learn 
from debates – subjectively as well as objectively. After watching a debate, recipients usually 
know more about the issues debated and candidates debating them. Learning effects are 
particularly pronounced for less known candidates (see, e.g., Holbrook 1999; Zhu et al. 1994) 
and candidates running for one’s ‘own’ party (see, e.g., Abramowitz 1978; Jacoby et al. 
1986). In addition, recipients do not only learn factual information. They often also consider 
themselves better informed about politics afterwards than prior to the debate (see, e.g., Kaid et 
al. 2000). This effect has already been demonstrated for German viewers of the Eurovision 
debate (Dinter and Weissenbach 2015). Based on these findings, we could expect that a 
debate among candidates for the post of Commission President should lead to a greater 
awareness of the candidates and their respective stances on EU policies. We therefore expect 
that watching the debate increases the ability of viewers’ to make judgements about the 
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 10
candidates’ personal and political profiles (H1). In addition, we expect that debate exposure 
increases viewers’ sense about being informed about the EU and EU politics (H2). 
 
Second, more competitive and consequential elections could also have an effect on the 
motivations underlying political involvement and political participation. Hix (2013: 11) states 
this expectation quite clearly: “If a party-based contest for the President of the Commission 
emerges in 2014 […] some citizens in Europe would feel they have influenced the choice of 
the most powerful office in the EU for the first time.“ Moreover, Follesdal and Hix (2006: 
550) assume that “competition fosters political debate” and thus assume that exposure to a 
leadership contest should increase campaign interest and campaign communication. It should 
also instil a sense of internal efficacy, i.e., the feeling that people have some means of 
influence on EU politics. The debate literature provides ample evidence that debates can 
stimulate the motivations underlying electoral participation. In particular, it has been 
demonstrated that watching televised debates usually increases campaign interest (see, e.g., 
Pfau 1987; Weaver and Drew 2001). Moreover, debate viewership correlates with higher 
turnout (see, e.g., Best and Hubbard 1999). In particular, it positively affects participation of 
voters with a low level of campaign interest (Maier and Faas 2011). There is less conclusive 
evidence when it comes to the effects on viewers’ feeling of internal efficacy. Based on the 
findings in the existing literature, we expect that exposure to a televised debate will increase 
campaign interest (H3). Given the new features of the 2014 EP election campaign with ‘lead 
candidates’ competing for the office of Commission President, we also expect that watching 
the debate will strengthen viewers’ feeling of internal efficacy (H4) even though there is little 
evidence in the literature pertaining to this so far (see, e.g., Hobolt 2014). Viewers might very 
well understand though that – for the very first time since the first direct elections to the EP in 
1979 – they have an actual say in deciding on the EU’s top personnel and the EU’s political 
agenda. After all, Monica Maggioni, the moderator of the Eurovision debate, as well as Alexis 
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 11
Tsipras and Martin Schulz emphasized in the course of the televised debate that one of the 
European parties’ top candidates would serve as the next Commission President, which also 
reflected the overall media tone in the run-up to the election – even though some national 
governments were hesitant to fully accept the new procedure prior to the elections. Overall, 
we think that there is good reason to believe that the audience of the debate accepted these 
claims, which in turn leads us to expect a positive effect of watching the debate on viewers’ 
internal efficacy. 
 
Third, heightened political competition can have consequences for political attitudes about 
the EU. Follesdal and Hix (2006: 550) posit “political competition is an essential vehicle for 
opinion formation. Competition fosters political debate, which in turn promotes the formation 
of public opinion on different policy options”. Following this line of reasoning, political 
competition could potentially counteract the second-order character of EP elections, which 
still “have very little to do with ‘Europe’” (Hix 2008: 79). Thus, boosting political 
competition should increase the relevance of candidates running for office at the EU-level and 
of EU issues.3 More precisely, Hix (2008) claims that, instead of focussing on the national 
policy agenda more electoral competition will highlight the relevance of EU issues and 
contribute to the EU’s perceived legitimacy. Turning to the debate literature, the actual 
influence of debates on political attitudes (and voting behaviour, which is not the focus of this 
contribution) is heavily disputed. While two meta-analyses (Benoit et al. 2003; McKinney 
and Warner 2013) indicate that viewing televised debates affects issue preferences, attitudes 
towards the candidates as well as voting behaviour, most studies on debates in the U.S. 
suggest that debates can only reinforce already existing attitudes and voting intentions rather 
than transform them (for a summary see McKinney and Carlin 2004). These findings tie in 
with the results from classical campaign research that a reinforcement of existing attitudes 
and voting intentions is the most important campaign effect. Mechanisms of selective 
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 12
exposure and selective information processing usually prevent individuals from receiving 
‘wrong’, i.e., contradictory information, and thus from changing their attitudes (Lazarsfeld et 
al. 1944). On the other hand, debate exposure strengthens the perceived importance of the 
issues debated (see, e.g., Benoit et al. 2003). The picture for debates in European states is less 
clear-cut. For some European countries the impact of debates seems to be rather limited (e.g., 
Maricchiolo et al. 2010), whereas studies for other countries suggest that debates are more 
persuasive. For instance, it has been demonstrated that almost one fifth of the Croatian voters 
changed their voting intention after the 2005 debates (Skoko 2005). Furthermore, significant 
parts of the German electorate changed their opinions about the respective candidates running 
for chancellor and even revised their voting intentions after watching a debate (see, e.g., 
Maier and Faas 2011). The strongest impact was observed for citizens not identifying with a 
particular political party, but there were also significant conversion effects for people with an 
existing party attachment (see, e.g., Maier and Faas 2011). In addition, existing research also 
indicates that the Eurovision debate affected candidate evaluations. Most of the candidates for 
Commission President were perceived more positively by German voters after watching the 
debate (Dinter and Weissenbach 2015). In addition, exposure to the debate significantly 
increased favourable opinions about EU integration and reduced fears about the EU (Maier et 
al. 2016). 
 
Finally, debates can also have an impact on more general attitudes about the political system. 
The few studies available indicate that watching debates causes more favourable evaluations 
of the political system (Wald and Lupfer 1979). This is particularly true for young German 
voters following the Eurovision Debate (Maier 2015). Based on these findings, we contend 
that exposure to the Eurovision debate should increase the perception that important problems 
should be solved by the EU (rather than at the national level) (H5). Furthermore, based on 
studies indicating that positive media coverage of the EU should lead to more positive EU 
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 13
attitudes (for a summary see, e.g., Hobolt and Tilley 2014: 87) as well as on research 
suggesting that one major focus of the Eurovision debate was to highlight the virtues of the 
EU (de Vreese and van der Brug 2016), we expect debate viewership to result in more 
positive attitudes about the EU as a polity (H6). These expectations are consistent with the 
findings that televised debates can have agenda-setting effects and increase positive attitudes 
about the political system as a whole. 
 
Research design 
 
To assess the impact of the Eurovision Debate4 among the five top candidates nominated by 
the respective Europarties – Jean-Claude Juncker (European People’s Party), Martin Schulz 
(Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Guy Verhofstadt (Alliance for Democrats 
and Liberals for Europe), Ska Keller (Greens/European Free Alliance), Alexis Tsipras 
(European United Left) – we set up a quasi-experimental pretest-posttest study in 24 
European countries (for details see online appendix 1). In total, 828 eligible voters (mostly 
students) watched the debate as it was broadcasted live on a large screen in their respective 
universities.5 Reception modes differed across countries, depending on whether or not a 
national broadcasting station aired the debate. 78.0 per cent of the participants were able to 
watch the debate simultaneously, translated in their national language; 13.8 per cent watched 
the original version of the debate as provided by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU; 
candidates were either speaking in English or with simultaneous translation into English), 
although this was in most cases not the native language of our participants.6 Immediately 
prior and immediately after the debate the participants were asked to fill in questionnaires.7 
The questionnaires included questions on campaign interest, attitudes towards European 
integration, knowledge about the EU, knowledge about and attitudes towards the candidates, 
expectations about (posttest: perceptions of) the debate and the candidates’ debate 
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 14
performance, perceptions of the EP election campaign, voting intentions, demographics 
(pretest only), and – in cases the debate was not provided in the respondents’ mother tongue – 
how well they understood the debate8 (posttest only).9 
 
In general, the basic design of this study is similar to a design, which has been successfully 
applied in the past to explore the impact of televised debates in Germany for a series of 
debates there (see, e.g., German Longitudinal Election Study 2014; Maier and Faas 2003; 
Maurer et al. 2007). Such a strict pretest-posttest design, in which participants fill out 
questionnaires immediately prior to the debate and also directly afterwards, allows us to trace 
possible effects of the debate – in line with our hypotheses presented above – on the 
participants of the study in a rigorous manner. We do want to stress, though, that the design of 
our study does not include a control group. Strictly speacking, without such a control group, 
we are not able to separate effects of the pretest questionnaire from effects of the treatment 
(i.e. the debate). As there is evidence that our sample does not suffer from questionnaire 
effects we consider any statistically significant deviation from zero as an impact of the 
debate.10 Other data confirm this assessement.11  
 
In order to analyse the data we decided to weight the countries according to their population 
size. The basic idea behind this weighting procedure is to get an impression of how young and 
well-educated citizens across Europe respond to the campaign. By weighting the data we want 
to avoid that our results are affected by the scholars’ resources, opportunities, and experiences 
with experimental research, which might have affected the sample sizes obtained in the 
individual countries.12 The weighted data set includes 51.8 per cent female respondents 
(minimum: 7.7 per cent in Slovenia; maximum 81.0 per cent in Romania; F=1.98, df=23, 
p<.01). The average age is 22.9 years (minimum: 20.0 years in Lithuania; maximum: 29.7 
years in Ireland; F=6.33, df=23, p<.001). 93.6 per cent of the participants are students 
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 15
(minimum: 83.3 per cent in France; the sample consists exclusively of students in Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, and Sweden; 
F=2.41, df=23, p<.001). Most of the students are enrolled in a political science program (38.5 
per cent), a social science program (23.2 per cent), or a program in communication studies 
(18.0 per cent). 20.3 per cent of the students were enrolled in another program (Χ2=653.47, 
df=69, p<.001). From those participants who followed the debate in English, without English 
being their native language, 1.4 per cent indicated that they understood less than 50 per cent 
of what the candidates said. On average, participants exposed to the English version of the 
debate indicated that they understood 84.5 per cent of all candidate messages (minimum: 67.0 
in Latvia; maximum: 90.6 per cent in Finland; F=3.51, df=8, p<.01). 
 
Our sample is, of course, neither representative for any of the countries under investigation 
nor for young voters. As experiments in general, our data lacks external validity. 
Nevertheless, our design is useful for assessing debate effects. First, different to survey data 
experiments have a high internal validity. We know that the participants of our study were 
exposed to the debate. Hence, shifts in attitudes have to be considered as debate-induced 
changes. Second, we have no indication that the processing of the debate and its effects are 
different for voters not included in our sample. Although various scholars argue that voluntary 
student samples are too “narrow” to draw more general conclusions, other researchers have 
found that those samples are appropriate to study social behavior (Druckman and Kam 2011; 
Exadaktylos et al. 2013). Since we are interested in the effect of the debate (and not in 
distributions of EU-attitudes), we contend that our findings are valid for young and well-
educated European voters in general. 
 
Results 
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 16
Debate effects on political cognitions 
 
With reference to H1 we expect that exposure to the Eurovision debate should increase the 
voters’ ability to evaluate the candidates’ personal and political profile. This expectation is 
clearly corroborated (see table 1). Prior to the debate, the average viewer was only able to 
describe his/her feelings toward a minority of the candidates (M=2.38). After the debate 
almost every respondent had an opinion about all of the five candidates (M=4.99). This 
increase is statistically significant (p<.001). The same pattern holds for the candidates’ 
political positions. Before the debate, respondents could state an ideological position for, on 
average, 2.16 candidates and on EU integration for, on average, 1.96 candidates. After the 
debate, ideological respectively EU positions are reported for, on average, 4.84 candidates. 
These increases (+2.68 respectively +2.88) are statistically significant (p<.001). Although 
there is a positive impact of debate exposure for both the personal and the political profile of 
the candidates in all countries, the effect varies considerably across countries. For all three 
variables the country-specific impact of the debate is significant (p<.001). 
 
- table 1 about here - 
 
We also expect that exposure to the Eurovision debate should increase the perceived level of 
information about EU politics (H2), which is confirmed by our analysis. Overall, the level of 
subjective information increases from -.30 before the debate to -.04 after the debate. This shift 
of .26 scale points is statistically significant (p<.001). The maximum effect is +.72, while the 
strongest negative effect is -.17. Again, our results indicate that reactions to the debate differ 
significantly across countries (p<.001). 
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 17
The Eurovision debate did not only help recipients to develop first-time attitudes towards the 
candidates. We also see that respondents who already had an opinion about the contenders 
shifted their perceptions of the candidates’ ideological positions and of their stance on EU 
integration (see table 2). With respect to ideology, all candidates are perceived to stand further 
to the left after than before the debate (with the exception of Juncker). For Schulz (p<.05), 
Tsipras (p<.001) and Keller (p<.001), these change are statistically significant. In addition, 
the perceived ideological polarization among the candidates has increased in the wake of the 
debate. The average ideological distance between the candidate perceived as most to the left 
and the candidate perceived as most to the right increases from 4.46 to 6.24 scale points 
(p<.001). 
 
- table 2 about here - 
 
Furthermore, the debates helped citizens to develop and sharpen their views about the 
candidates’ positions on EU integration. All candidates are perceived as more pro-EU after 
the debate. Except for Tsipras (p>.05), all changes are statistically significant. In addition, the 
debate provided viewers with information helping them to distinguish the candidates. As a 
consequence, the perceived polarization between the contenders has significantly increased 
from, on average, 3.54 to 4.09 scale points (p<.001). 
 
Debate effects on motivations 
 
We also hypothesized that watching the debate will positively affect the motivations 
underlying electoral participation. In particular, exposure to the debate should lead to an 
increase in campaign interest (H3) as well as to a stronger sense of internal efficacy (H4). We 
can confirm both hypotheses. With respect to internal efficacy, we observe a significant 
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 18
increase from .19 before the debate to .26 after the debate (table 3). The shift of +.07 scale 
points is statistically significant. Still, in four out of 24 countries, we observe that internal 
efficacy has decreased. The maximum effect is -.33. In contrast, exposure to the debate has 
stimulated an increase in internal efficacy in the overwhelming majority of countries. The 
maximum effect is +.41. 
 
- table 3 about here - 
 
In addition, we see a significant increase in campaign interest. Starting from 1.83 scale points 
before the debate, campaign interest rose by .26 scale points to 2.09 scale points after the 
debate. In each of the countries under investigation, campaign interest has increased. The 
smallest effect is +.04, the largest +.70. Although in most countries the impact of the debate 
on motivation turned out to be positive, the size of the effects significantly differ across 
countries for internal efficacy (p<.001) as well as campaign interest (p<.01). 
 
Debate effects on political attitudes 
 
With respect to political attitudes we argued that the importance attached to EU issues is 
likely to rise if citizens were exposed to the Eurovision debate (H5). In addition, we have 
claimed that attitudes towards the EU should become more favourable as a consequence of 
debate exposure (H6). H5 can be confirmed. The share of respondents who indicate that the 
most pressing political problem at the domestic level should now be solved at the EU level 
increased from 44.5 per cent before the debate to 52.9 per cent after the debate (table 4). The 
increase of 8.4 percentage points is statistically significant. However, in three out of the 24 
countries under investigation, we observed the opposite trend. The strongest negative impact 
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 19
is -16.0 percentage points. Nevertheless, the perceived relevance of the EU increased in most 
countries. The largest effect is +37.5 percentage points. 
 
- table 4 about here - 
 
In addition, the data indicate that debate exposure causes more pro-EU attitudes. In particular, 
the already rather favourable view towards European integration (M=1.06) has become more 
favourable as a result of debate exposure (M=1.45). This increase is statistically significant 
(+.39 scale points, p<.001). At the country level, the strongest negative impact is -.21, the 
largest positive effect is +1.58. In contrast to these findings, general support of one’s country 
EU membership remained by-and-large unchanged (M=.65 before vs. M=.63 after the debate, 
difference: -.02 scale points, p>.05). Hence, H6 can only partially supported. In seven out of 
24 countries we observe a decline of EU support. The strongest negative impact of the debate 
is -.40 scale points. Nevertheless, in the majority of countries, respondents developed more 
favourable EU attitudes as a consequence of debate reception. The strongest effect is +.33 
scale points. For all variables under investigation we observe very different responses across 
the different EU member states, which pass the levels for statistical significance (at least 
p<.05). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our data, which reflects the attitudes and perceptions of young and well-educated voters 
across 24 EU member states, suggests that exposure to the debate caused higher cognitive and 
political involvement. In particular, exposure to the debate enabled our respondents to make 
more informed judgements of the candidates’ personality and political profile (H1). Even 
those viewers who had an opinion about the candidates’ ideological position and their stance 
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 20
on EU integration prior to the debate displayed a tendency to change their perceptions 
afterwards. Most noteworthy is that the perceived polarization among the candidates has 
increased due to debate reception. This is true for both dimensions. Despite some doubts 
expressed in the literature (see, e.g., de Vreese and van der Brug 2016), the debate clearly 
helped voters to distinguish the candidates running for Commission President. Moreover, 
watching the debate also increased the overall level of information about EU politics (H2), led 
to a heightened sense of internal efficacy, i.e., the belief that one can influence politics (H3), 
and a stronger interest in the campaign (H4). In addition, having watched the debate also led 
respondents to display stronger agreement with the claim that the most important political 
problems of one’s own country should be solved at the EU-level (H5). Furthermore, viewers 
also tended to hold more positive evaluations about the EU. Since we could not observe this 
pattern for all EU-related attitudes, H6 can only partially supported.13 
 
Overall, our results indicate that exposure to the Eurovision Debate has been conducive to 
infuse the EP election campaign with a dose of political competition, thereby tackling one of 
the professed causes of the EU’s democratic legitimacy deficit. We have demonstrated that by 
watching the debate, our respondents have not only developed better knowledge about the 
candidates’ stances on the EU and policy issues, they have also come to see the differences in 
these positions more clearly. The claim voiced by Follesdal and Hix (2006) that increased 
political competition instils cognitive involvement and lead to more informed vote choice is 
thus borne out. In contrast, the finding that exposure to the debate does not increase support of 
one’s country EU membership runs counter to the expectation that positive coverage of the 
EU leads to more positive EU attitudes and hence an increase in the EU’s perceived 
legitimacy.  
 
Page 20 of 50
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjpp E-mail: jeremy.richardson@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Journal of European Public Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
 21
Based on our results, which broadly support the argument about the positive effects of 
political competition on public support, we suggest that the debate format is an appropriate 
instrument to foster political debate, citizen involvement and support in the EU. As the 
recognition of the top candidates running for Commission President increases the likelihood 
to participate in the 2014 EP elections (Schmitt et al. 2015), exposure to the debate can also 
have highly desirable behavioural consequences. From this perspective, EU pundits should 
press for a wide and prominent coverage of TV debates among ‘lead candidates’ in future EP 
elections. The 2014 debate can thus serve as a starting point for developing a tradition of 
televised debates, which already exist in many democracies. This format is particularly 
important for EP elections, because debates among political leaders competing for political 
office can serve as a common point of reference (see also Benoit 2014: 4) for all European 
citizens, when otherwise the number of EP election campaigns matches the number of 
member states. Hence, such a debate can foster an EU-wide campaign format by providing a 
common frame for national campaigns. In addition, future televised debates will offer exciting 
opportunities for political communication research on EP election campaigns. Unlike 
previous effect-analyses focusing on, e.g., the impact of (national) EP campaign spots, 
(national) EP campaign posters, or (national) media coverage of the EP campaign, a debate 
among leaders running for Commission President provides the opportunity to compare the 
impact of an uniform campaign stimulus across different EU member states. Moreover, we 
have shown that bringing together research on political campaigns in general and TV debates 
in particular with research on the EU’s democratic credentials offers ample opportunities to 
scrutinize claims that have hitherto not been subject to systematic empirical exploration. We 
are thus positive that research on the effects of campaign information, such as TV debates, not 
only improves our understanding about the mechanisms underlying EP campaign effects, but 
also about their implications for the legitimacy of the EU’s political system. 
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Of course, our data and research design have some limitations. Although our experimental 
design leaves little room for speculations about how young and well-educated votes react to a 
debate among political leaders in the EU, we have no empirical evidence about how other 
groups of voters were influenced by exposure to the debate format. Based on results from 
debate research, we assume that we rather underestimated the potential impact of the debate. 
Existing research indicates that debate effects are stronger for voters with lower levels of 
education (see, e.g., Maier and Faas 2011). One crucial step to remedy this shortcoming is to 
use the format of representative survey, including an item about whether or not a respondent 
was watching the debate. This would enable us to find out about the impact of the debate on 
other groups of voters. In addition, survey data could provide us with insights about who 
actually watched the debate. Second, the effects we found cannot be generalized to the public-
at-large. The media neither provided an appropriate stage for the debate, nor did media 
broadcasters put a lot of effort into covering this event.14 As impressive as it may sound that 
the Eurovision debate was broadcasted by 55 TV and nine radio channels as well as streamed 
on 88 websites across the EU and beyond (European Broadcasting Union 2014a, 2014c), most 
of the media channels airing the debate were, at best, small, second-rate or highly specialized 
news-channels, which tend to attract only a limited viewership. Moreover, in some member 
states the debate was accessible only via internet-live-stream or broadcasted the next day (see 
online appendix 2). Although the moderator of the debate, Monica Maggioni, was keen to 
stress that the debate would be highly attractive to voters – she argued that the candidates 
would have the “chance to tell 400 million voters why they should get Europe’s biggest job” 
(see Maier and Faas 2014: 4) – the available audience ratings were rather poor in most 
countries (see online appendix 2).15 Compared with the viewership of TV debates preceding 
national elections, the Eurovision debate fared poorly. For example, the TV debate in the run-
up of the 2013 German national election attracted 17.7 million viewers (Gscheidle and 
Gerhard 2013: 565). In contrast, the Eurovision debate was watched by 160,000 viewers, less 
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than one per cent of the national debate audience in Germany. Despite some selective 
audience rating-successes in individual countries, such as Cyprus, the media missed an 
opportunity to put the European elections in the limelight. In the event that debates between 
the top candidates running for Commission President will become a feature of future EP 
election campaigns, the media should definitely increase their coverage of the event and 
provide airtime in more established programs to increase the audience ratings. Of course, this 
criticsm also applies to national political parties, which are the main actors in the campaign 
and, until now, have displayed little enthusiasm to highlight the importance of the debates 
(see Franklin 2014). Third, not all EU member states are included in our study and some of 
the sample sizes are small. To obtain a more complete picture for the EU subsequent studies 
should include all member states with a sufficient number of cases. Increasing the number of 
observations would also offer the opportunity to run more sophisticated data analyses (e.g., 
multi-level analyses) and to uncover country-specific response patterns. Since our results 
suggest that there are cross-cultural differences, this could be a very promising path for even 
more rigid testing in the future and for establishing cross-cultural experimental work as a line 
of research. Finally, from the purview of democratic accountability, it is important for voters 
to know where political decisions originate in order to be able to assign responsibility. It has 
been demonstrated in the literature that access to more EU-related information increases the 
accuracy of citizens’ responsibility attributions (Hobolt and Tilley 2014: 148), thus fostering 
democratic accountability. Our findings suggest that the debate has made our respondents 
more informed about the EU and led to increased awareness of its relevance for problem-
solving. This should, as a result, enable them to “better … navigate the complex institutional 
landscape of the EU” (Hobolt and Tilley 2014: 149). While this is potentially good news from 
a democratic accountability perspective, our study does not lend itself to sweeping 
generalizations. Whether or not the Eurovision Debate can be seen as a modest step towards 
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reducing the democratic accountability deficit necessitates further experimental or survey-
based research. 
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Table 1: Impact of the Eurovision debate on political cognitions 
 Before 
the debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Number of candidates rated 
by sympathy 
2.38 4.99 +2.61, p<.001 +.95 +4.00 p<.001 
Number of candidates rated 
by ideological position 
2.16 4.84 +2.68, p<.001 +1.00 +4.05 p<.001 
Number of candidates rated 
by position on EU integration 
1.96 4.84 +2.88, p<.001 +1.37 +4.30 p<.001 
Information about EU 
politics 
-.30 -.04   +.26, p<.001 -.17 +.72 p<.001 
Notes: Sympathy of the candidates: ‘How would you describe your feelings toward the candidates of tonight’s debate?’; respondents could indicate that they do 
not know. Based on this information, a six-point scale from 0 (‘cannot describe a feeling for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘can describe a feeling for each of the 
candidates’) was created; Portugal has been excluded from the analysis of this question as the candidates’ sympathy ratings were not asked in the Portuguese 
posttest survey. Candidate ideological position: ‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”’. What is the position of [candidate]?’; six-point 
scale from 0 (‘do not perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘perceive a position for each of the candidates’). Candidate position on EU integration: 
‘Some say European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone 
too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this issue?’; six-point scale from 0 (‘do not perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 
(‘perceive a position for each of the candidates’). Information about EU politics: ‘I am very well informed about EU politics’; five-point scale from -2 (‘strongly 
disagree’) to +2 (‘strongly agree’). 
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Table 2: Impact of the Eurovision debate on perceived candidates’ ideological positions and positions on EU integration 
       
 Before 
the debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Ideological position       
Juncker 6.56 6.63 +.07, p>.05 -1.94 +2.33 p>.05 
Schulz 4.01 3.83 -.18, p<.05 -2.00 +1.00 p>.05 
Verhofstadt 6.10 6.00 -.10, p>.05 -3.00 +1.50 p>.05 
Tsipras 2.83 1.87 -.97, p<.001 -5.40 +.80 p<.05 
Keller 3.94 2.64 -1.30, p<.001 -2.83 +1.08 p>.05 
Candidate polarization 4.46 6.24 +1.78, p<.001 -.06 +4.40 p<.001 
Position on EU integration       
Juncker 5.77 6.60 +.83, p<.001 -2.75 +3.00 p<.001 
Schulz 6.34 6.78 +.44, p<.001 -1.79 +1.80 p>.05 
Verhofstadt 5.44 6.56 +1.12, p<.001 -1.75 +3.25 p>.05 
Tsipras 5.65 5.74 +.09, p>.05 -2.00 +2.33 p>.05 
Keller 6.24 6.80 +.56, p<.01 -2.50 +6.00 p>.05 
Candidate polarization  3.54 4.09 +.55, p<.001 -4.75 +1.73 p<.01 
Notes: Analyses are based on subjects evaluating the respective candidates before and after the debate; NIdeology=(285; 511), NEU Integration=(269; 474). Candidate 
ideological position: ‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”’. What is the position of [candidate]?’; eleven-point scale from 0 (‘left’) to 10 
(‘right’). Candidate position on EU integration: ‘Some say European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should 
be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this issue?’; eleven-point scale from 0 (‘European 
integration has already gone too far’) to 10 (‘European integration should be pushed further’). Candidate polarization: absolute difference between the candidate 
perceived as ideological most left and the candidate perceived as ideological most right respectively between the candidate perceived as most in favour of further 
EU integration and the candidate perceived as most critical of further EU integration. 
  
Page 26 of 50
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjpp E-mail: jeremy.richardson@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Journal of European Public Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
 27
Table 3: Impact of the Eurovision debate on motivations 
 Before the 
debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Internal efficacy .19 .26 +.07, p<.01 -.33 +.41 p<.001 
Campaign interest 1.83 2.09   +.26, p<.001 +.04 +.70 p<.01 
Notes: Internal efficacy: a) ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.’, b) ‘I have a 
pretty good understanding of what is going on in politics.’; five-point scale from -2 (‘strongly disagree’) to +2 (‘strongly agree’); after item a) has been reversed 
both variables were put together into an index running from -2 (‘low internal efficacy’“) to +2 (‘high internal efficacy’). Campaign interest: ‘And to what extent 
would you say are you interested in the current European election campaign?’; four-point scale from 0 (‘not at all’) to 3 (‘very’). 
 
Table 4: Impact of the Eurovision debate on political attitudes 
 Before the 
debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Most important national 
problem should be solved by 
EU 
44.5 52.9 +8.4, p<.001 -16.0 +37.5 p<.01 
Position on EU integration 1.06 1.45 +.39, p<.001 -.21 +1.58 p<.05 
Evaluation of EU 
membership 
.65 .63 -.02, p>.05 -.40 +.33 p<.001 
Notes: Most important problem: ‘What do you think would be the most appropriate level to deal with those three problems that you have just mentioned?’; 
1=’European level’, 2=’national level’, 3=’regional/local level’; code 1 was multiplied by 100, codes 2 and 3 are recoded into code 0. EU integration: ‘Some say 
European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. 
What is your opinion on this issue?’ Eleven-point scale from -5 (‘European integration has already gone too far’) to +5 (‘European integration should be pushed 
further’). EU membership: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good 
nor bad?’; three-point scale from -1 (‘bad thing’) to +1 (‘good thing’). 
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Note on contributors 
 
See online appendix “author information”. 
 
Contact 
 
Jürgen Maier, University of Koblenz-Landau, Department for Political Science, 
Kaufhausgasse 9, D-76829 Landau; E-Mail: maierj@uni-landau.de 
 
Notes 
 
* Inta Brikse and Aldo Di Virgilio passed away before the paper was published. We are 
saddened by their loss and dedicate this paper to their memory. 
1. See Franklin (2014: 9-10) for a critical assessment of the institutional change adopted in 
the Lisbon Treaty. He expects that it is rather unlikely that national parties will design 
their campaigns around the issues highlighted by the different candidates running for 
Commission President. 
2. See, e.g., http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/editorial-on-the-importance-of-the-
eu-election-for-european-democracy-a-971766.html; accessed 21 February 2016; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-elections-2014-a-vote-for-europe--
or-simply-a-chance-to-put-the-boot-in-9406013.html; http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-22904941; accessed 29 May 2015. 
3. At the same time, increasing competition could also carry negative consequences for the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy. In particular, since political competition creates winners and 
losers, losers might not “accept the winning coalition as legitimate” (Hix 2008: 188). 
Moreover, others argue that enhanced political competition unleashes a “sleeping giant” 
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(van der Eijk and Franklin 2004: 32), by activating pro or anti EU-orientations, especially 
when debates revolve around constitutive issues, which relate to the EU’s institutional 
trajectory or its membership base (see Bartolini 2005). 
4. For a transcript of the debate see Maier and Faas (2014). 
5. In most instances, the debate was watched on TV on 15 May 2014. In some countries, the 
debate was broadcasted via an Internet live-stream, but not on TV. In addition, in some 
states the debate was videotaped and broadcasted the next day (see online appendix 2). 
Due to technical reasons (e.g., because the university was closed when the debate was 
aired live on TV) recipients in the Czech Republic, France, Romania (Cluj), and Sweden 
watched the videotaped debate. 
6. The remaining 8.2 per cent of the sample started with the simultaneous translation but had 
to switch to the EBU version due to either bad translation or technical problems. 
7. In general, the questionnaires were in English. In some countries, the questionnaires were 
translated in the native language. 
8. Overall, these respondents did understand the debate very well, as their answers show. 
Only four of these respondents indicated that they understood only about half of the 
debate. The exclusion of these respondents from data analysis does not affect our results. 
9. In seven countries, recipients additionally had the opportunity to spontaneously evaluate 
the candidates during the debate. To do so, they used a web-based RTR push button 
system (for a description of the system see Maier et al. 2016). Using this system, 
individual positive and negative reactions to candidate messages were recorded on a 
second-by-second basis. Real-time response measurement of candidate messages was 
successfully implemented in Germany, Poland, Slovenia, and United Kingdom including 
210 participants. As it has been demonstrated that using RTR technique in general neither 
distracts people from following the debate nor increases attention to the debate (Maier 
2012), it seems unlikely that this treatment will affect the variables in focus of this paper. 
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10. It has been shown that in experimental studies with self-recruited participants having a 
very high level of general interest in politics questionnaire-induced pretest-posttest 
differences are very rare (see, e.g., Lupfer and Wald 1979). In addition, our pretest-
questionnaires show for specific debate-related questions that the specific knowledge is 
rather low to non-existent. Against this backdrop, the pretest-questionnaire is unlikely to 
activate pre-existing knowledge. 
11. We have tested the existence of pretest-posttest differences for a control group for the 
design that has been applied to the European debate in the context of the 2013 German 
Federal Election (the data can be downloaded via hwww.gesis.org/wahlen/gles/daten/; 
study number ZA5711) and did not find any significant changes for campaign interest, 
political efficacy, and for different measures of EU-related attitudes for the control group. 
12. An analysis of the unweighted or differently weighted data indicates that our weighting 
procedure does not cause an exaggeration of debate effects: About half of the observed 
influences are slightly stronger if we do not weight the data or if weight all countries 
equally whereas the other half is slightly weaker. Furthermore, applying other weighting 
strategies does not change the reported results substantially. The only exception is that 
Tsipras is perceived as significantly more in favour of EU integration after the debate than 
before if the data is not weighted or if we weight all countries equally (p<.05). In the data 
presented in table 2 this effect is insignificant. In addition, country differences tend to be 
more often statistically significant if no or an alternative weighting procedure is used. The 
results for these alternative weighting procedures are provided in online appendix 3. 
13. Our data analyses also show that the reactions to the debate were far from homogenous 
across the different EU member states: The between-country differences of the measured 
debate effects display statistical significance for all variables included in our study. Since 
the goal of this contribution was to look at the aggregate picture, we can neither report nor 
discuss and explain the potential causes of the observed cross-country differences here, 
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but these findings will need further exploration. In addition, our findings suggest that 
lessons about the impact of the debate cannot simply be transferred from one country to 
another. Obviously, the domestic context matters for the effect of campaign messages 
(see, e.g. Hobolt 2014). 
14. For the debate media sweep surrounding the debate, see European Broadcasting Union 
(2014b). 
15. To our knowledge there is no information about the total reach of the debate. 
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Online appendix 1: Information about the sample 
Country City RTR 
measurement 
Number of respondents 
eligible to vote 
Austria Salzburg, Vienna No 40 
Bulgaria Sofia No 25 
Croatia Zagreb No 36 
Cyprus Nicosia No 27 
Czech Republic Prague No 21 
Denmark Odense No 13 
Finland Turku No 19 
France Nice Yes 12 
Germany Landau, Mainz, Munich Yes 135 
Greece Kastoria No 50 
Hungary Budapest No 15 
Ireland Cork No 27 
Italy Bologna, Siena, Trento No 120 
Latvia Riga No 27 
Lithuania Vilnius No 25 
Malta Valletta No 20 
Netherlands Amsterdam Yes 20 
Poland Warsaw Yes 25 
Portugal Lisbon No 13 
Romania Bucharest, Cluj Yes (Bucharest) 58 
Slovakia Bratislava No 26 
Slovenia Ljubljana Yes 26 
Sweden Umeå No 22 
United Kingdom Exeter Yes 26 
Total   828 
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 1
Online appendix 2: Information about the structure and the importance of TV broadcasters in the EP debate 
 
Country Name of TV 
station 
Public/private 
TV station 
Importance (in 
terms of 
audience reach) 
Special 
information/ 
news channel 
Day/time when 
the debate is 
broadcasted 
Simultaneous 
translation into 
national 
language 
Audience rating 
Austria ORF III Public Medium Specialized in 
cultural 
information 
Live Yes  
Belgium No information 
available 
      
Bulgaria Bulgarian 
National 
Television 
Public Medium No Live 
 
Yes Rating: 2.8% at 
the time when 
the debate is 
scheduled 
Croatia HTV1, HTV4 Public High HTV1: main 
public TV 
channel 
HTV4: more 
focused on news 
and 
documentary 
genres 
Live Yes Share: 3.1% 
(HTV1) 
respectively .5% 
(HTV4) 
Cyprus Euronews  Public Medium Yes Live 
 
Yes 200.000 
viewers, share: 
about 13% 
Czech 
Republic 
ČT24 Public Low Yes Broadcasted on 
May 16, 8 pm 
Yes  
Denmark DR Public High No Livestream on 
website 
Don’t know; the 
stream did not 
work in any 
available 
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 2
Country Name of TV 
station 
Public/private 
TV station 
Importance (in 
terms of 
audience reach) 
Special 
information/ 
news channel 
Day/time when 
the debate is 
broadcasted 
Simultaneous 
translation into 
national 
language 
Audience rating 
browser 
Estonia No information 
available 
      
Finland National 
Broadcasting 
Company 
(YLE) 
Public High Yes Livestream on 
website; 
Broadcasted 
with subtitles on 
May 16th, 3.05 
pm 
No  
France No information 
available 
      
Germany Phoenix Public Low Yes Live Yes 160.000 
viewers, 
share: .5% 
Greece Hellenic 
Parliament TV 
(Vouli 
Television) 
Public Low Official TV of 
the Hellenic 
Parliament 
Live Yes Not available 
Hungary ATV Private Medium Yes Live Yes 80.000 viewers, 
share: 2.02% 
(18+ age) 
Ireland Radió Teilifís 
Ėireann  
RTE News Now 
Public Low Yes Live Yes (for Tsipras 
and Juncker) 
 
Italy Rai News 24 Public low Yes Live Yes 127.000 
viewers; share: 
.47% 
Latvia No information       
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 3
Country Name of TV 
station 
Public/private 
TV station 
Importance (in 
terms of 
audience reach) 
Special 
information/ 
news channel 
Day/time when 
the debate is 
broadcasted 
Simultaneous 
translation into 
national 
language 
Audience rating 
available 
Lithuania LRT Kultūra Public low No Live Yes  
Luxembourg No information 
available 
      
Malta Debate was not 
broadcasted by a 
national TV 
station 
      
Netherlands Debate was not 
broadcasted by a 
national TV 
station 
      
Poland Debate was not 
broadcasted by a 
national TV 
station 
      
Portugal RTP Informação Public low Yes Live Yes 6.800 viewers; 
share: < 1%) 
Romania TVR1 Public Low No Live Yes Not available 
Slovakia RTVS Public Low No Live Yes Not available 
Slovenia RTV Slovenia Public high (but in 
terms of online 
streaming: 
moderate) 
No. Livestream on 
the website 
Yes Not available 
Sweden SVT Public high No Broadcasted on  
May 16th, 
afternoon 
Yes Not available 
Spain No information       
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 4
Country Name of TV 
station 
Public/private 
TV station 
Importance (in 
terms of 
audience reach) 
Special 
information/ 
news channel 
Day/time when 
the debate is 
broadcasted 
Simultaneous 
translation into 
national 
language 
Audience rating 
available 
UK BBC Parliament Public low Yes (specialist 
even within 
news channels) 
Live   
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 1
Online appendix 3: Results of alternative weighting procedures  
 
Table 1a: Impact of the Eurovision debate on political cognitions (without weighting) 
 Before 
the debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Number of candidates rated 
by sympathy 
2.62 4.98 +2.35, p<.001 +.95 +4.00 p<.001 
Number of candidates rated 
by ideological position 
2.37 4.89 +2.52, p<.001 +1.00 +4.05 p<.001 
Number of candidates rated 
by position on EU integration 
2.22 4.89 +2.66, p<.001 +1.37 +4.30 p<.001 
Information about EU 
politics 
-.30 +.04   +.34, p<.001 -.17 +.72 p>.05 
Notes: Sympathy of the candidates: ‘How would you describe your feelings toward the candidates of tonight’s debate?’; respondents could indicate that they do 
not know. Based on this information, a six-point scale from 0 (‘cannot describe a feeling for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘can describe a feeling for each of the 
candidates’) was created; this question was not asked in Portugal. Candidate ideological position: ‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”’. 
What is the position of [candidate]?’; six-point scale from 0 (‘do not perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘perceive a position for each of the 
candidates’). Candidate position on EU integration: ‘Some say European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) 
should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this issue?’; six-point scale from 0 (‘do not 
perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘perceive a position for each of the candidates’). Information about EU politics: ‘I am very well informed 
about EU politics’; five-point scale from -2 (‘strongly disagree’) to +2 (‘strongly agree’). 
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 2
Table 2a: Impact of the Eurovision debate on perceived candidates’ ideological positions and positions on EU integration (without weighting) 
       
 Before 
the debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Ideological position       
Juncker 6.66 6.66 .00, p>.05 -1.94 +2.33 p<.05 
Schulz 3.93 3.64 -.30, p<.01 -2.00 +1.00 p>.05 
Verhofstadt 5.94 5.90 -.04, p>.05 -3.00 +1.50 p>.05 
Tsipras 2.53 1.83 -.71, p<.001 -5.40 +.80 p<.05 
Keller 4.00 3.16 -.84, p<.001 -2.83 +1.08 p>.05 
Candidate polarization 4.29 6.14 +1.86, p<.001 -.06 +4.40 p<.001 
Position on EU integration       
Juncker 5.59 6.44 +.85, p<.001 -2.75 +3.00 p<.001 
Schulz 6.42 6.89 +.47, p<.001 -1.79 +1.80 p>.05 
Verhofstadt 5.69 6.74 +1.05, p<.001 -1.75 +3.25 p>.05 
Tsipras 5.01 5.45 +.45, p<.05 -2.00 +2.33 p>.05 
Keller 6.08 6.74 +.66, p<.001 -2.50 +6.00 p>.05 
Candidate polarization  3.49 4.02 +.53, p<.001 -4.75 +1.73 p<.001 
Notes: Analyses are based on subjects evaluating the respective candidates before and after the debate; NIdeology=(285; 511), NEU Integration=(269; 474). Candidate 
ideological position: ‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”’. What is the position of [candidate]?’; eleven-point scale from 0 (‘left’) to 10 
(‘right’). Candidate position on EU integration: ‘Some say European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should 
be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this issue?’; eleven-point scale from 0 (‘European 
integration has already gone too far’) to 10 (‘European integration should be pushed further’). Candidate polarization: absolute difference between the candidate 
perceived as ideological most left and the candidate perceived as ideological most right respectively between the candidate perceived as most in favour of further 
EU integration and the candidate perceived as most critical of further EU integration. 
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 3
Table 3a: Impact of the Eurovision debate on motivations (without weighting) 
 Before the 
debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Internal efficacy .17 .27 +.10, p<.001 -.33 +.41 p<.001 
Campaign interest 1.79 2.09   +.29, p<.001 +.04 +.70 p<.001 
Notes: Internal efficacy: a) ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.’, b) ‘I have a 
pretty good understanding of what is going on in politics.’; five-point scale from -2 (‘strongly disagree’) to +2 (‘strongly agree’); after item a) has been reversed 
both variables were put together into an index running from -2 (‘low internal efficacy’“) to +2 (‘high internal efficacy’). Campaign interest: ‘And to what extent 
would you say are you interested in the current European election campaign?’; four-point scale from 0 (‘not at all’) to 3 (‘very’). 
 
Table 4a: Impact of the Eurovision debate on political attitudes (without weighting) 
 Before the 
debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Most important national 
problem should be solved by 
EU 
43.7 54.2 +10.4, p<.001 -16.0 +37.5 p<.05 
Position on EU integration 1.18 1.56 +.38, p<.001 -.21 +1.58 p<.01 
Evaluation of EU 
membership 
.64 .66 +.02, p>.05 -.40 +.33 p<.001 
Notes: Most important problem: ‘What do you think would be the most appropriate level to deal with those three problems that you have just mentioned?’; 
1=’European level’, 2=’national level’, 3=’regional/local level’; code 1 was multiplied by 100, codes 2 and 3 are recoded into code 0. EU integration: ‘Some say 
European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. 
What is your opinion on this issue?’ Eleven-point scale from -5 (‘European integration has already gone too far’) to +5 (‘European integration should be pushed 
further’). EU membership: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good 
nor bad?’; three-point scale from -1 (‘bad thing’) to +1 (‘good thing’).   
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 4
Table 1b: Impact of the Eurovision debate on political cognitions (weighing all countries equally) 
 Before 
the debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Number of candidates rated 
by sympathy 
2.40 4.98 +2.58, p<.001 +.95 +4.00 p<.001 
Number of candidates rated 
by ideological position 
2.08 4.86 +2.78, p<.001 +1.00 +4.05 p<.001 
Number of candidates rated 
by position on EU integration 
1.88 4.86 +2.98, p<.001 +1.37 +4.30 p<.001 
Information about EU 
politics 
-.33 .00   +.33, p<.001 -.17 +.72 p<.01 
Notes: Sympathy of the candidates: ‘How would you describe your feelings toward the candidates of tonight’s debate?’; respondents could indicate that they do 
not know. Based on this information, a six-point scale from 0 (‘cannot describe a feeling for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘can describe a feeling for each of the 
candidates’) was created; this question was not asked in Portugal. Candidate ideological position: ‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”’. 
What is the position of [candidate]?’; six-point scale from 0 (‘do not perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘perceive a position for each of the 
candidates’). Candidate position on EU integration: ‘Some say European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) 
should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this issue?’; six-point scale from 0 (‘do not 
perceive a position for any of the candidates’) to 5 (‘perceive a position for each of the candidates’). Information about EU politics: ‘I am very well informed 
about EU politics’; five-point scale from -2 (‘strongly disagree’) to +2 (‘strongly agree’). 
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 5
Table 2b: Impact of the Eurovision debate on perceived candidates’ ideological positions and positions on EU integration (weighing all countries 
equally) 
       
 Before 
the debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Ideological position       
Juncker 6.77 6.73 -.04, p>.05 -1.94 +2.33 p<.01 
Schulz 3.99 3.59 -.40, p<.001 -2.00 +1.00 p>.05 
Verhofstadt 5.89 5.89 -.01, p>.05 -3.00 +1.50 p<.05 
Tsipras 2.79 1.95 -.83, p<.001 -5.40 +.80 p<.01 
Keller 4.03 3.33 -.70, p<.001 -2.83 +1.08 p<.05 
Candidate polarization 4.34 6.29 +1.96, p<.001 -.06 +4.40 p<.001 
Position on EU integration       
Juncker 5.82 6.54 +.72, p<.001 -2.75 +3.00 p<.001 
Schulz 6.47 6.86 +.39, p<.01 -1.79 +1.80 p<.01 
Verhofstadt 5.89 6.86 +.97, p<.001 -1.75 +3.25 p>.05 
Tsipras 4.91 5.33 +.42, p<.05 -2.00 +2.33 p>.05 
Keller 6.17 6.62 +.46, p<.05 -2.50 +6.00 p<.01 
Candidate polarization  3.42 4.14 +.72, p<.001 -4.75 +1.73 p<.001 
Notes: Analyses are based on subjects evaluating the respective candidates before and after the debate; NIdeology=(285; 511), NEU Integration=(269; 474). Candidate 
ideological position: ‘In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”’. What is the position of [candidate]?’; eleven-point scale from 0 (‘left’) to 10 
(‘right’). Candidate position on EU integration: ‘Some say European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should 
be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What do you think is the position of [candidate] on this issue?’; eleven-point scale from 0 (‘European 
integration has already gone too far’) to 10 (‘European integration should be pushed further’). Candidate polarization: absolute difference between the candidate 
perceived as ideological most left and the candidate perceived as ideological most right respectively between the candidate perceived as most in favour of further 
EU integration and the candidate perceived as most critical of further EU integration.   
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 6
Table 3b: Impact of the Eurovision debate on motivations (weighing all countries equally) 
 Before the 
debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Internal efficacy .22 .29 +.07, p<.001 -.33 +.41 p<.001 
Campaign interest 1.75 2.03   +.28, p<.001 +.04 +.70 p<.001 
Notes: Internal efficacy: a) ‘Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.’, b) ‘I have a 
pretty good understanding of what is going on in politics.’; five-point scale from -2 (‘strongly disagree’) to +2 (‘strongly agree’); after item a) has been reversed 
both variables were put together into an index running from -2 (‘low internal efficacy’“) to +2 (‘high internal efficacy’). Campaign interest: ‘And to what extent 
would you say are you interested in the current European election campaign?’; four-point scale from 0 (‘not at all’) to 3 (‘very’). 
 
Table 4b: Impact of the Eurovision debate on political attitudes (weighing all countries equally) 
 Before the 
debate 
After 
the debate 
Difference; 
significance of 
difference 
Strongest 
negative effect 
Strongest 
positive effect 
Significance 
of country 
differences 
Most important national 
problem should be solved by 
EU 
41.6 50.4 +8.9, p<.001 -16.0 +37.5 p<.05 
Position on EU integration .97 1.33 +.37, p<.001 -.21 +1.58 p<.01 
Evaluation of EU 
membership 
.64 .65 +.01, p>.05 -.40 +.33 p<.001 
Notes: Most important problem: ‘What do you think would be the most appropriate level to deal with those three problems that you have just mentioned?’; 
1=’European level’, 2=’national level’, 3=’regional/local level’; code 1 was multiplied by 100, codes 2 and 3 are recoded into code 0. EU integration: ‘Some say 
European integration (i.e., the economic and political cooperation between the member states) should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. 
What is your opinion on this issue?’ Eleven-point scale from -5 (‘European integration has already gone too far’) to +5 (‘European integration should be pushed 
further’). EU membership: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good 
nor bad?’; three-point scale from -1 (‘bad thing’) to +1 (‘good thing’). 
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